Examined Life

Philosophical reflections


Moral Deference

Doctors always tell us to take our medication three times a day, before meals. I once asked my doctor whether the instruction to take it “before meals” actually mattered—that is, whether the medication worked properly only on an empty stomach—or whether it was merely a heuristic designed to make it easier to take medication regularly at consistent intervals. My doctor replied, “It depends on the medication, but in this case, you can take it before or after meals. It doesn’t really matter.” I took my doctor’s word for it and proceeded to take the medication whenever I felt like it. (I suspect I interpreted the doctor’s advice rather too liberally.)

Not long after I became a lawyer, I found myself facing a moral dilemma. I’d rather not go into the details, but it wasn’t anything terribly serious. Most people would probably have asked, “Why are you even worrying about that?” Nevertheless, the problem weighed quite heavily on me, to the point that I even considered emailing a professor of ethics at Seoul National University for advice (though I never actually did). Six years later, I now happen to be taking a course with that very professor. The professor has no idea that we almost became acquainted in this rather unusual way.

Hardly anyone, I suspect, questions a doctor’s instruction to take medication three times a day before meals. But very few people would think of emailing a philosophy professor when faced with a moral dilemma. Indeed, they might find the very idea of consulting a philosophy professor for moral advice rather strange. But why? Why do we readily trust medical experts while finding it odd to defer to moral experts on matters of morality? Is there some relevant difference between medicine and morality?

One intuitively appealing answer is that medical facts can be independently verified against empirical evidence, whereas moral facts cannot. But hardly anyone actually attempts to verify their doctor’s advice against empirical evidence. We don’t go looking for studies on the causal relationship between taking medication on an empty stomach and its effectiveness. We simply trust the doctor. So this doesn’t seem like a particularly satisfying explanation.

There is a more plausible explanation. When we follow a doctor’s instructions to take medication three times a day, we don’t merely trust the doctor. We also hold the doctor responsible for the advice. If we take the medication three times a day as instructed and suffer complications from an overdose, we can legitimately hold the doctor accountable. Moral judgments, however, seem different. Someone who makes a mistaken moral judgment cannot escape moral responsibility by pleading, “I was just doing what the philosophy professor told me to do.” By contrast, there’s nothing particularly strange about someone who has taken medication incorrectly explaining, “I was just following my doctor’s instructions.” It seems, then, that we have an intuition that moral judgments, unlike other kinds of judgments, cannot simply be delegated to others, nor can responsibility for them be shifted elsewhere. Perhaps this is the relevant difference between morality and medicine.

Let’s consider another explanation, one that begins with how we understand the nature of moral action. Imagine that I’m apologizing to a close friend for something I’ve done wrong. What if I were to say, “I asked a philosophy professor, and apparently I ought to apologize to you. So, I’m sorry.” My friend would hardly take this as a genuine apology. They might even think I was a psychopath. But there’s nothing remotely strange about saying, “I asked my doctor, and apparently I should take the medication three times a day before meals.” Taking medication is an action directed toward an instrumental end: the restoration of one’s health. The doctor’s advice is simply a means of achieving that end more effectively. Moral action, however, is different. Moral action is fundamentally relational. We apologize not merely to comply with the dictates of some moral rule, but to treat our friends as they deserve to be treated and to repair our relationships with them. It’s difficult to find any recognition of that relational dimension in the words, “I asked a philosophy professor, and apparently I ought to apologize to you. So, I’m sorry.”

We might also approach the problem from a diachronic perspective. Visiting doctors frequently and receiving prescriptions doesn’t necessarily increase my medical knowledge. After all, we go to the doctor to get better, not to become doctors ourselves. But morality is different. We deliberate about moral problems not only to arrive at the right moral judgment in the particular situation before us, but also to become better at making moral judgments in the future. Think back to a time when you had an argument with a close friend. Initially, you might have been angry, convinced that your friend had treated you unfairly and without justification. But as your emotions subsided and you reflected on what had happened, you might have come to recognize what you had done wrong and understand why your friend had reacted as they did. Through that process, you repaired the relationship, became more considerate toward your friend, and grew less likely to quarrel over the same issue again. But someone who simply follows a philosophy professor’s instructions and apologizes is deprived of that opportunity to cultivate their moral capacities.

The final explanation may well be the most important. When we take medication, what ultimately matters to us is the outcome: getting better. Why the medication works, or why taking it three times a day before meals makes it more effective, is not something I’m particularly interested in for its own sake. As long as the medication works and I recover, that’s all that matters. Moral problems, however, are different. Most people think that why we act matters just as much as whether we act morally, and they regard an agent’s reasons for acting as an important consideration when evaluating that agent. Philosophers generally think that for something we say or do to count as an action in the philosophical sense, it must be performed for a reason. Consider the difference between someone’s arm jerking upward reflexively after being struck by a Taser and someone raising their hand to ask a question during a seminar. These are clearly different kinds of occurrences. The former may have a causal explanation, but it cannot properly be said to have been done for a reason. The same applies to moral action. Suppose someone walking down the street accidentally trips, causing a pedestrian behind them to stop and thereby avoid a falling sign. Compare this with someone who sees the sign falling and deliberately throws themselves in front of the pedestrian to save them. Although the outcomes are the same, the two cases seem morally very different. The latter, unlike the former, is an action performed for a reason.

Just as importantly, actions, especially moral actions, must be performed for the right reasons. Suppose you decide whether to keep a promise to a friend by tossing a coin. The coin happens to land heads, so you keep your promise. Keeping the promise is an action performed for a reason, but it is not performed for the right reason. Apologizing to a friend because a philosophy professor told you to, rather than because you’ve reflected on your conduct, recognized your wrongdoing, and come to regret it, seems much like keeping a promise on the basis of a coin toss. In both cases, the right thing is done, but for the wrong reason.

We have considered four possible explanations for the difference between trusting a doctor’s advice and trusting a philosophy professor’s moral judgment. But there is something worth noticing here: none of these explanations suggests that seeking moral advice from others is itself problematic. We often confide our moral concerns to priests, parents, or close friends and ask for their advice. (A philosophy professor may be a somewhat unusual choice, admittedly.) But seeking advice is something to be commended, not regarded as strange.

The problem lies not in seeking advice, but in shifting responsibility for our moral judgments onto someone else, failing to endorse those judgments as our own, and refusing to accept answerability for why we have made them. It lies in neglecting the reflection and practice necessary to become better moral agents. It lies in treating morality as nothing more than rule-following, while disregarding the relational significance of moral action and the moral consideration owed to those affected by it. And it lies in forgetting that acting for the right reasons matters just as much as doing the morally right thing.



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